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Alexander	Somek	&	Michael	A.	Wilkinson	
Unpopular	Sovereignty?	
Popular sovereignty was presented in modern 
constitutional discourse as a mode of collective action. 
It was supposedly manifest in the power to constitute, 
control and dismantle governments. Important strands 
of contemporary constitutional theory, notably legal 
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy, have 
taken leave of this tradition. They have severed the 
connection between sovereignty and action. What 
remains of popular sovereignty is fundamental rights 
and values, or dispersed networks of deliberation. This 
is based on the the idea that the place of power is 
‘empty’ and legitimised on the principle of including 
‘All-Affected-Interests’. The very concept of sovereignty 
thus becomes unpopular. This contribution aims to re-
establish the link between popular sovereignty and 
action by examining sovereignty’s emancipatory telos, 
its majoritarian mode of operation and its dependence 
on political citizenship. 
I. Introduction 
As political authority is increasingly transnationally 
shared, dispersed and relativized, sovereignty appears 
increasingly redundant.1 In the process, the reality of 
 
1 The literature on sovereignty is immense. For specific 
discussion of the recent transformation of sovereignty see e.g. 
Neil MacCormick, Questioning	 Sovereignty:	 Law,	 State	 and	
Nation	 in	 the	 European	 Commonwealth (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1999); Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Globalization, Sovereignty, and the 
Rule of Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism?’ 
(2001) Constellations 442 – 460; Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty 
in the European Union’ In Sovereignty	 in	 Transition	 (ed. N. 
Walker, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 3-32; Martin Loughlin, 
‘The Erosion of Sovereignty’ (2017) Netherlands	Journal	of	Legal	
Philosophy 57 – 81.  
—————— 2 —————— 
contemporary governance over-writes long-cherished 
beliefs concerning the idea of the state and the concept 
of popular sovereignty. This occurs in three ways.  
First, the notion of supreme rule over a territory is 
contradicted by the de	 facto power of private actors, 
which has a pronounced effect in the areas of 
regulation and dispute settlement.2 Transnational 
corporations hold sway over national polities by 
threatening governments and constituencies with exit 
or divestment. The locus of real power shifts from the 
state to those calling the shots in the international 
economy, such as investors, companies and rating 
agencies.3  
Second, there is an increasing preponderance of 
international cooperation and of organisations which 
create de	 jure power to regulate.4 International 
 
2 For introductions, see Gralf-Peter Calliess & Peer 
Zumbansen, Rough	 Consensus	 and	 Running	 Code:	 A	 Theory	 of	
Transnational	 Private	 Law (Oxford: Hart Publ., 2010); ; Ralf 
Michaels, ‘Globalisation and Law: Law Beyond the State’, In Law	
and	Social	Theory (ed. R. Banakar & M. Travers, 2nd ed., Oxford: 
Hart Publishing 2013) 287-303; Peer Zumbansen, 
‘Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of 
Public Authority and Private Power’ (2013) 76 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 117-138; Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz 
Renner, ‘Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of 
Global Governance’ (2009) 22 Ratio Iuris 260-280 at 272-276; 
Eyal Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance (The Hague: 
Academy of International Law, 2014). 
3 See Quinn Slobodian, Globalists:	 The	 End	 of	 Empire	 and	
Birth	 of	 Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 2018). 
4 For an overview of softer and harder instruments, see 
Matthias Goldmann, ‘Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources 
—————— 3 —————— 
agreements give birth to new entities which then claim 
autonomous status, and, as in the case of the EU, 
substantial law-making and governing power beyond 
the original remit. 5  In the face of these developments, 
the belief that sovereign legal status represents the 
foundation of real political power seem to amount to 
an outdated abstraction.6  
Third, even if sovereignty were not affected by 
private power or sublated in the sphere of 
international cooperation, it is normatively suspect. 
States acting by themselves cannot accomplish much, 
for they lack the capacity to address challenges of a 
transnational or global kind, from international 
terrorism to the impact of climate change. Attempts to 
go it alone merely indicate myopia or nostalgia.  
Liberal constitutional theory, unsurprisingly and 
often unapologetically, tends to endorse the de	 facto, 
de	jure and normative demise of sovereignty.7 Its basic 
instincts, as it were, incline it to do so. Sovereign 
 
to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of Public Authority’, In 
The	Exercise	of	Public	Authority	by	International	Institutions (ed. 
v. A v. Bogdandy et al., Heidelberg: Springer, 2010) 661-711 
5 See Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing	 Europe: Effective	 and	
Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 24-25. 
6 See Robert O. Keohane, After	Hegemony:	Cooperation	and	
Discord	 in	 the	 World	 Economy (2d ed., Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005) 
7 See already John Locke, John Locke, Two	 Treatises	 of	
Government (ed. P. Laslett, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1960), Second Treaties § 22, p. 284.  Most prominently, in 
recent times, Mattias Kumm, ‘The Best of Times and the Worst 
of Times’ In Twilight	of	Constitutionalism? (ed. M. Loughlin & P. 
Dobner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 201-219. 
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powers are designed to interfere with natural liberty. 
Less of it is at least prima	 facie better for human 
freedom. Although associated with modern 
libertarianism, advocacy of a minimal state or ‘night 
watchman state’ has its roots in the classical liberalism 
of the 18th and 19th centuries.8 Contemporary liberal 
constitutional theory has not entirely shed this 
original skin.  
The gradual democratisation of the political 
authority of the state over two centuries of struggle for 
universal suffrage does not deter the liberal from 
adopting an anti-sovereigntist position. If anything, 
the popularisation of sovereignty makes the liberal 
theorist even more sceptical of sovereignty and the 
exercise of sovereign powers.  
There are two inter-related dimensions to this 
liberal scepticism. First, there is a domestic dimension, 
owing to the fear of the so-called ‘tyranny of the 
majority’.9 In the liberal imagination, the democratic 
 
8 Although the term was used pejoratively by socialist 
Ferdinand Lassalle to caricature classical liberalism, Neumann 
observes that it is misleading to the extent that it neglects the 
tremendous executive power wielded by the classical liberal 
state, not least in its military-imperalist ambitions. See Franz 
Neumann, The	 Democratic	 and	 the	 Authoritarian	 State (New 
York: Free Press, 1957) at 22 - 23. On the „nightwatchman idea“, 
see Ferdinand Lassalle, Arbeiterprogramm:	 Über	 den	
besonderen	 Zusammenhang	 der	 gegenwärtigen	
Geschichtsperiode	 mit	 der	 Idee	 des	 Arbeiterstandes (Berlin: C. 
Ihring Nachfolger, 1874) at 30. 
9 See The	 Federalist (ed. C. Sunstein, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press 2009) No. 51, p. 343. Alexis de 
—————— 5 —————— 
authority of the state must be prevented from 
becoming a vehicle for public decisions which violate 
minority rights. The answer to this conundrum is to 
vest sovereignty in a constitution which protects 
liberal rights and places trust in authoritative 
interpreters of the constitution. Second, there is an 
inter-state dimension. Owing to policy externalities, 
democratic states can abuse sovereignty, or behave 
“undemocratically”, by creating adverse effects for 
outsiders who are, by definition, excluded from 
political participation. This is what a sibling of liberal 
constitutionalism suggests, namely the All-Affected 
Interests Principle, which stipulates that all those 
affected by a decision should in principle be given a say 
in it.10 States can earn legitimate credentials only by 
limiting majoritarian decision-making and opening 
themselves up to some kind of input from beyond their 
borders, creating frameworks for internalising 
externalities or disciplining their decision-making 
processes.11  
Liberal discourse concludes, therefore, that 
sovereignty is not only implausible, it is undesirable. 
The goal of the legal scholar, it has even been said, is to 
 
Tocqueville, Democracy	in	America	(trans. H. C. Mansfield & D. 
Winthrop, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) 239-242. 
10 For one of the first formulations of the All-Affected 
Principle, see Robert A. Dahl, After	the	Revolution?	Authority	in	
a	Good	Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) at 49. 
11 See Christian Joerges & Jürgen Neyer, ‘”Deliberative 
Supranationalism” – Two Defences’ (2002) 8 European	 Law	
Journal 133-151.  
—————— 6 —————— 
‘neutralise it’.12 This conclusion appears to be 
reconfirmed, in particular, where sovereignty is vested 
in ‘the people’. In fact, popular sovereignty strikes 
liberal theory as doubly faulty, for it combines belief in 
sovereign state power with belief in the existence of a 
mystical body of “a people”.13 In practice, the argument 
goes, sovereignty feeds the politics of national 
populism.14 The results are likely to be highly 
repugnant from a liberal perspective, populism 
reducing politics to a confrontation between “the 
 
12 András Jakab, European	 Constitutional	 Language 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 116. 
13 See Mattias Kumm, ‚The Best of Times and the Worst of 
Times’ In Twilight	 of	 Constitutionalism? (ed. M. Loughlin & P. 
Dobner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 201-219. 
14 The idea of popular sovereignty becomes reinvigorated in the 
context of “populist” political rhetoric. The right-wing version 
of populism is associated with the idea of the people as a 
culturally and morally homogenous group preceding the 
constitutional order. See Paul Blokker, ‘Populist 
constitutionalism’ in: Routledge	Handbook	 of	 Global	 Populism, 
ed. C. De la Torre (Oxford: Routledge 2018) 113-128, at 125. 
From this perspective, the relation between the constitutent 
power and constituted powers is not very subtle. The former is 
simply taken to be generative of the latter. On the shortcoming 
of this view, see Luigi Corrias, ‘Populism in a Constitutional Key: 
Constituent Power, Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional 
Identity’ (2016) 12 European	Constitutional	Law	Review 6-26 at 
16-18. On the recurrence of the old “Anti-Federalist Idea” that 
the representatives ought to be of the same kind as the 
represented, see Cesare Pinelli, ‘The Populist Challenge to 
Constitutional Democracy’ (2011) 7 European	 Constitutional	
Law	Review 5-16 at 11. 
—————— 7 —————— 
people” and “the elites” and degrading the values of 
pluralism and constitutionalism.15 
This paper aims to engage critically with such a 
debunking of popular sovereignty.16 It begins with a 
reminder of the constitutional discourse that 
originally provided modern popular sovereignty with 
an intellectual habitat. In that context, popular 
 
15 Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Populism and Constitutionalism’ in 
Oxford	 Handbook	 of	 Populism ed. C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. 
Taggard, P. Ochia Espejo & P. Ostiguy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017) 590-606. In right-wing populism the distinction 
between detached elites and ordinary people is often 
overwritten by another distinction, between “us” and “them” – 
with the latter standing for migrants, cosmopolitan liberals or 
multilateralists. The self-assertion of the ordinary people may 
hence manifest in aggression towards migrants, immigrants or 
foreigners in general. See Dirk Jörke & Veith Selk, ‘Der hilflose 
Antipopulismus’ (2015) 43 Leviathan 484-500 at 488: Kolja 
Möller, ‘Populismus und Verfassung: Der autoritäre Populismus 
als Herausforderung für die liberale Demokratie’ (2019) 66 
Zeitschrift	für	Politik 430-444 at 440, 443. 
16 On the rich historical connections between populism and 
popular sovereignty, reaching back into the 19th century, see 
Duncan Kelly, ‘Populism and the History of Popular Sovereignty’ 
in Oxford	Handbook	of	Populism above, 511 – 534. We are not 
offering a historical account here, even though the exploration 
of the historical roots of popular sovereignty can accomplish 
much to overcome contemporary misconceptions. See Daniel 
Lee, Popular	 Sovereignty	 in	 Early	 Modern	 Political	 Thought 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) and the anthology 
Popular	Sovereignty	in	Historical	Perspective  (ed. R. Bourke & Q. 
Skinner, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). See 
also Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing	 the	 People:	 The	 Rise	 of	
Popular	Sovereignty	in	England	and	America (New York: Norton 
and Co., 1989) and Geneviève Nootens, Popular	Sovereignty	in	
the	West	(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).  
—————— 8 —————— 
sovereignty was believed to be manifest in action—in 
acts of political founding and political resistance.  
Once constitutional theory departs from this 
tradition, sovereignty is severed from the world of 
action,  exhausting itself in the morally required 
recognition of fundamental values or deemed to reside 
in the ethereal networks of public deliberation. While 
the first development is epitomised by the 
predominance of legal constitutionalism (legality, 
fundamental rights, proportionality), 17 the second is 
manifest in conceptions of deliberative democracy.  
With the disappearance of sovereign action, 
displaced by legality and discourse ethics, the material 
struggle for inclusion and equality also disappears. 
The harnessing of the power of the many that was the 
hallmark of democracy as a historical phenomenon 
recedes from view,18 and with it the possibility of 
emancipatory bootstrapping: of addressing and 
overcoming the adversity inherent in the horizontal 
interdependence of the market through political 
action. A group of people can no longer rise above—
and reach out beyond—themselves by acting as a 
people.19  
 
17 See e.g. David Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of the Question of 
Constituent Power’ In The	 Paradox	 of	 Constitutionalism:	
Constituent	Power	and	Constitutional	Form (ed. M. Loughlin & N. 
Walker, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 129-146. 
18 See John Keane, The	Life	and	Death	of	Democracy (New 
York: Norton & Company, 2009). 
19 For a recent account of the tension between democracy 
and markets, see Wolfgang Streeck, Buying	Time:	On	the	Delayed	
Crisis	of	Democratic	Capitalism (London: Verso 2013). 
—————— 9 —————— 
Can the philosophy of popular sovereignty be 
resurrected? The aim of this paper is to begin that task. 
It will proceed, first, by outlining the modern 
constitutional foundations of the idea of popular 
sovereignty (part II). It continues by reconstructing 
the move to de-popularise sovereignty through 
substituting legal constitutionalism and deliberative 
democracy, underlying which is Claude Lefort’s idea of 
democracy as signifying the ‘empty place of power’,20 
and the legitimising principle of ‘All-Affected-
Interests’ (part III). This move will be critiqued here as 
severing the realm of democracy, and ultimately of 
popular sovereignty, from the sphere of action (part 
IV). An account will then be offered of how democracy 
and action might be reunited, outlining three elements 
of popular sovereignty: an emancipatory telos, 
majoritarianism, and political citizenship (part V). 
II. The Foundations of Modern Popular 
Sovereignty 
Modern constitutionalism was based on a number of 
elementary ideas.21 Chief among them is the view that 
a constitution is composed of powers, broadly 
understood as either law-making (normative) powers 
 
20 Claude Lefort, The	 Political	 Forms	 of	 Modern	 Society:	
Bureaucracy,	 Democracy,	 Totalitarianism (ed. J.B. Thompson, 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986). Cf. Bert van Roermund, 
‘Sovereignty: Unpopular and Popular’ In Sovereigny	 in	
Transition	note	1, 33-54. 
21 A reliable guide to these ideas still is Thomas Paine, Rights	
of	Man (ed. E. Foner, London: Penguin 1984). 
—————— 10 —————— 
or permissions to act. Skilful constitutional design 
arranges powers in such a manner that their 
interaction promises to be conducive to the public 
good. Adapting James Madison’s famous words, as long 
as ambition counteracts ambition, each will run in its 
proper channel.22 
This conception is congenial to the mind-set of the 
mixed constitution. But in the modern constitutional 
imagination that flows from the 17th and 18th century 
revolutions, the various powers do not derive 
originally from particular groups or represent 
different estates, but are partial instantiations of one 
sovereign power. The various powers established by 
the constitution are functional specifications of the one 
power that is all power, namely sovereignty.23 This 
does not mean that normative powers are necessarily 
centralised.24 On the contrary; the activity of 
 
22 See The	Federalist, note 10 No. 51, at 341. 
23 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The	 Social	 Contract 
(Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998) at 15-16: 
‘the Contract, which is an ‘act of association produces a moral 
and collective body, which receives from this same act its 
unity… This public person, which is thus formed by the union of 
all the individual members, formerly took the name of city, and 
now takes that of republic, which is called by its members state 
when it is passive, sovereign when it is active, power when it is 
compared to similar bodies. With regard to its associates, they 
take collectively the name of people, and are called individually 
citizens, in participating in the sovereign power, and subjects, as 
subjected to the law of the state’.  
24 See Martin Loughlin and Stephen Tierney, ‘The Shibboleth 
of Sovereignty’ (2018) 81:6 Modern	Law	Review	989 – 1016. 
—————— 11 —————— 
governing25 is entirely compatible with a federal 
system or a system of devolved powers. What it means 
is that authority derives ultimately from the 
constituent power of the people. Popular sovereignty 
can then be understood as representing nothing less 
than the autonomy of the political realm.26 
Bernard Yack distinguishes the modern 
constitutionalist idea of popular sovereignty from 
earlier invocations of sovereignty through the concept 
of representation.27 While previously the people were 
believed to be coextensive with the many or the group 
whose members did not occupy a noble rank (viz., the 
“commoners” or the demos),28 modern popular 
sovereignty introduces something like the idea of the 
“people’s two bodies”.29 The people qua authors of the 
constitution comprise a corpus	 mysticum. Not to be 
encountered directly in whoever claims to act on its 
behalf,30 it is a noumenal entity inaccessible to actual 
experience, in a manner reminiscent of Kant’s thing-in-
 
25 See Michael Oakeshott, ‘On Being Conservative’ In his 
Rationalism	 in	Politics	 and	Other	Essay	 (2nd. Ed., Indianapolis: 
Liberty Press, 1991) 407-437 at 429. 
26 See Martin Loughlin, ‘Why Sovereignty?’ In Sovereignty	
and	 Law:	 Domestic,	 Regional	 and	 Global	 Perspective (ed. 
Rawlings, Leyland and Young, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 
34. 
27 See Bernard Yack, ‘Popular Sovereignty and Nationalism’ 
(2001) 29 Political	Theory 517-536. 
28 See Berhard Yack, Nationalism	and	the	Moral	Psychology	
of	 Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012) at 
99. 
29 See Yack, note 27 at 519. 
30 See Yack, note 28 at 101. 
—————— 12 —————— 
itself.31 Unsurprisingly, therefore, the significance of 
popular sovereignty is intrinsically tied to 
representation.32 But if representing something means 
making present what is absent, any actual interpretive 
elaboration of the representation of a sovereign people 
can highlight either presence or absence. Not only the 
constituent power, but the people themselves are thus 
the subject of conceptual struggle (a Grenzbegriff of 
constitutional discourse).33 
The presence of a represented corporate body in 
the representative is the distinguishing mark of that 
strand of the medieval theory of representation which 
originates in the work of Marsilius of Padua and leaves 
a strong imprint on conciliarist doctrines.34 The core 
idea is captured in Marsilius’ concept of representatio	
identitatis, which tacitly combines two different ways 
 
31 There is a good reason why Böckenförde called the 
constituent power a liminal concept, a Grenzbegriff, of 
constitutional law. Kant characterized the thing in itself as a 
Grenzbegriff. See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, ’The Constituent 
Power of the People: A Liminal Concept of Constitutional Law’ 
In Constitutional	and	Political	Theory:	Selected	Writings (ed. M. 
Künkler & T. Stein, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) 169-
185. 
32 On the claim that all action on behalf of a collective 
involves a form of representation, see Hans Lindahl, Authority	
and	 The	 Globalization	 of	 Inclusion	 and	 Exclusion (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018) 108-113; see also Corrias, 
note 15 at 17-18 
33 See Böckenförde, ibid. 
34 For example in Johannes Segovia’s work. See, generally, 
Hasso Hofmann, Repräsentation:	 Studien	 zur	 Wort-	 und	
Begriffsgeschichte	von	der	Antike	bis	ins	19.	Jahrhundert (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1974).  
—————— 13 —————— 
of designating “identity”. Representation is effected, 
first, not by delegation or mandate but by virtue of the 
identity of the representative. It matters who it is. 
According to Marsilius’ original doctrine, the pars	
valentior, i.e., the better sort, is representative of the 
group.35 This points to the second designation that 
actually provides a clue as to why the representative 
possesses the “right” identity. Representatives are 
those parts of a larger whole that best and most 
adequately express what this whole truly is or what it 
aspires to be.36 With identity-representation, the 
noumenon, which could never reveal itself of itself, is 
present in the representative.  
National identity offers a way to navigate the 
unruly seas of popular sovereignty.37 The nation, qua 
sovereign, is not an organ of the constitution; it is 
outside of the constitutional system. Yet, the will of the 
nation is articulated through the channels of 
 
35 See Vasileios Syros, Marsilius	 of	 Padua	 and	 the	
Intersection	 of	 Ancient	 and	 Medieval	 Traditions	 of	 Political	
Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011) at 91. 
36 This was the major point of those claiming that the 
Council of Bishops had a superior claim vis-à-vis the Pope to 
represent the corpus	mysticum of the Church. 
37 In the constitutionalist context, the will of the legislative 
body may be deemed inviolable and supreme because it is, 
rhetorically speaking, a synecdoche for the unfathomable 
people. Rousseau tries to avoid the problem of representation 
by identifying the legislative body with the people and the 
General Will as the expression of their direct and collective self-
legislation, see note 23 above. If this avoids the problem of 
representation, it appears to do so at the cost of restricting the 
polity to a small, homogenous unit.  
—————— 14 —————— 
constituted powers. It is thereby  rendered present in 
its absence. When appeals to the traditions or the 
world-historical mission of a people are internalized 
into the “ordinary life” of a political community, the 
absent presence of the people qua nation may become 
relatively stabilized over time and space. This 
indicates that the sovereign populus explicitly 
conceives of itself as a unity.38   
This imagining of sovereignty is troubling in certain 
respects. Nations tend to assert prerogatives vis-à-vis 
others who are not included or included only on 
inferior terms, as is often the case with non-citizens or 
those who aspire to become citizens.39 Nations 
historically claim territory that they assert as their 
own and then deny those displaced the right to claim 
citizenship. In this sense, acts of sovereign power are 
manifested through original land-grabs, imperialism 
and continuous processes of accumulation by 
dispossession.40 Nations also claim identity and 
determine conditions for membership in a manner 
that depends on exclusive ethnic criteria.  
The mediation of popular sovereignty can also give 
rise to authoritarian renderings, such as the idea that 
 
38 This is of great relevance to current populist ideas 
concerning popular sovereignty. See Corrias, note 15 at 23; 
Blokker, note 15, 113, 116. 
39 Even in a relatively deeply integrated union of states such 
as the EU, citizens are denied full political citizenship in another 
Member State, deprived of voting rights in general elections, 
and restricted to voting in municipal and European elections.  
40 See David Harvey, The	New	Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
—————— 15 —————— 
a dictator is the depositary of the ‘real will’ of the 
people.41 Who or what is destined to be the agent of 
identity representation depends essentially on what 
the represented entity is believed to be. If the entity is 
believed to be one racially homogenous body speaking 
with one voice, one “chosen” individual may act as its 
speaker. If the relevant entity is the future humanity 
that can only be anticipated in the consciousness of the 
revolutionary vanguard, then an elite party is a 
plausible representative. If, by contrast, what is to be 
represented is a corporate body operating on the basis 
of reason-giving, then it is most adequately brought 
forth by a deliberative institution.  
III. The great unravelling: Unpopular 
sovereignty 
A different picture emerges when the emphasis comes 
to rest on the absence of the represented. In this 
version, no representative can claim to mediate the 
presence of the people or rightfully to embody the 
noumenon in the world of appearances. In this vein, the 
German constitutional theorist Martin Kriele 
concluded that within a constitutional democracy 
sovereignty is impossible.42 One encounters only 
 
41 Evidently, populism is a context for the recrudescence of 
this idea. See Blokker, note 15 at 123; Hans Vorländer, ‚The 
good, the bad, and the ugly. Über das Verhältnis von Populismus 
und Demokratie – Eine Skizze’ (2011) Totalitarismus	 und	
Demokratie 8 187-194. 
42 See Martin Kriele, Einführung	in	die	Staatslehre (Reinbek: 
Rowohlt, 1976) at 224. 
—————— 16 —————— 
divided and dispersed powers and none of these, not 
even the legislature, is a more truthful representative 
than any other. In principle, the popular sovereign 
remains just as inaccessible as the idea of 
transcendental freedom. Both are unamenable to 
actual political experience.  
The transcendence of popular sovereignty is 
tantamount to a second death of God in political 
theory. While the first death of God merely led to the 
people claiming the place of the nomos	basileus43, now 
the whole conceptual fabric of modern political 
thought begins to unravel. In this context, we are 
witness to a twofold development: legal 
constitutionalism and theories of deliberative 
democracy. 
A.  Legal constitutionalism 
The first development involves an element of 
regression. In the course of the human rights 
revolution, as constitutionalism reaches a new stage,44 
it reverts to a legal mentality that predates modern 
 
43 Quoting Carl Schmitt quoting Pindar. See Carl Schmitt, On	
the	Three	Types	of	Juristic	Thought (trans. J. Bendersky, Praeger, 
2004). 
44 On the following, see Alexander Somek, The	Cosmopolitan	
Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2014). For an account of 
how the shape and point of the post-war German constitution 
was to embrace human rights, see Thilo Rensmann, ‘The 
Constitution as a Normative Order of Values: The Influence of 
International Human Rights Law on the Evolution of Modern 
Constitutionalism’ In Common	 Values	 in	 International	 Law:	
Essays	in	Honor	of	Christian	Tomuschat (ed. Pierre-Marie Dupuy 
et al., Kehl: Engel Verlag, 2006) 259-278. 
—————— 17 —————— 
democracy, namely, a modelling of constitutional 
authority that is reminiscent of natural law. Absolute 
monarchs were never supposed to be untrammelled 
by natural law. On the contrary, their rule had to pay 
heed to it as God’s law because it was to God, and only 
to God, that the ruler was answerable. While the 
sovereign ruled supreme vis-à-vis its subjects front-of-
stage, he was bound to comply with the precepts of 
natural reason back-of-stage.  
In a similar vein, the constitutionalism that 
emerges in post-war constitutional thought, 
paradigmatically in West Germany, allows popular 
sovereignty to act only for the purpose of recognition, 
that is, the recognition of human dignity and 
everything that follows from it. This new type of 
modern constitutional law puts human rights at the 
centre. The concrete people are rendered as the 
trustees of a project that is much greater, and far more 
universal, than the integrity of a national polity.  
It is not by accident that in such a system power 
typically shifts to the one institution that is charged 
with elaborating the normative significance of human 
rights, i.e., the constitutional court. As Christoph 
Möllers puts it, this bespeaks great distrust of the 
people.45 It reflects a fear of the people not only by 
elites, but by the people themselves, following a 
 
45 See Christoph Möllers, ‘“We are (afraid of) the people”: 
Constituent Power in German Constitutionalism’ In M. Loughlin 
& N. Walker (eds.), The	Paradox	of	Constitutionalism:	Constituent	
Power	 and	 Constitutional	 Form (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 87-105. 
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particular diagnosis that the interwar breakdown of 
liberal constitutionalism was at root a crisis of 
democratic excess.46   
This message was foreshadowed in late Weimar by 
none other than Carl Schmitt.47 In Legality	 and	
Legitimacy, Schmitt highlights the deep incongruity 
between the ‘value emphasis’ of the second part of the 
Weimar Constitution (introducing fundamental rights) 
and the ‘value neutrality’ of its organiziational first 
part.48 While the former commands respect on the 
grounds of its substance, the latter facilitates 
legislative or even constitutional change (if by 
supramajority) by contingent and heterogeneous 
“chunks of power”. There is no intelligible connection 
between the two, that is, no principle explaining why a 
haphazard and transient majority, even if composed of 
two-thirds of the votes, should be able to override or 
transform that which is a manifestation of essential 
values. There is no ‘middle road’ Schmitt asserts, 
‘between the principled value neutrality of the 
functionalist system of legality and the principled 
 
46 Cf. Michael A. Wilkinson, ‘The Reconstitution of Postwar 
Europe: Liberal Excesses, Democratic Deficiencies’ In  
Constitutionalism	 Beyond	 Liberalism	 (ed. M. Dowdle and M. 
Wilkinson , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); 
Michael A. Wilkinson, ‘Authoritarian Liberalism as 
Authoritarian Constitutionalism’ in Alviar and Frankenberg 
(eds.), Authoritarian	 Constitutionalism:	 Comparative	 Analysis	
and	Critique (Edward Elgar 2019) 317 – 338.  
47 See Carl Schmitt, Legality	and	Legitimacy (trans. J. Seitzer, 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2004). 
48 Ibid, at 46.  
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value emphasis of the substantive constitutional 
guarantees.’49  
Schmitt’s insight is radicalised in postwar thought. 
What emerges is not only the idea that certain 
fundamental rights and duties of the people ought to 
be treated as an unamendable part of the constitution, 
but that their validity be based on recognition by 
practical reason alone. The people – even as 
constitutional  legislator - cannot exempt themselves 
from having to fulfil the requirement of recognition of 
moral reason and need, and indeed must, play no 
direct part in the practice of recognition. That role is to 
be played by constitutional experts.50 
The new world of constitutional law displaces the 
constituent power, whether as ordinary or 
constitutional law-maker;51 constituent power 
disappears into the normative justification of the 
 
49 Ibid, 47. See further Benjamin Schupmann, Carl	Schmitt’s	
State	 and	 Constitutional	 Theory:	 A	 Critical	 Analysis (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017).  
50 See Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting	 Democracy:	 Political	
Ideas	in	Twentieth	Century	Europe (Princeton University Press, 
2012). For an assessment of the impact of this suspicion of 
democratic constituent power in the context of German 
reunification, contrasting with the South African case, see 
Simone Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular Sovereignty, and 
Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2004) Constellations 153 – 173.  For 
a critique of this mentality from the perspective of the US 
American constitutional tradition, see See Jed Rubenfeld, 
‘Unilateralism and Constitutionalism’ (2004) 79 New	 York	
University	Law	Review 1971-2028.  
51 See David Dyzenhaus, ‘Constitutionalism in an Old Key: 
Legality and Constituent Power’ (2012) 1 Global	
Constitutionalism 229-260. 
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conditions under which a group can legitimately claim 
to have exercised it.52 This is a world in which 
democracy passes merely as one form of “good 
governance” among others. The doctrines of 
reasonableness, proportionality or of balancing give 
this theorising a self-satisfactory but complacent ring; 
as if these judgments were somehow technical, value-
neutral or outside the structural relations of political 
and economic power.53 The supreme court – or the 
fictional omniscient judge - is the exemplar of public 
reason.54 In this worldview, at least within the 
European Union, we have moved ‘beyond the 
sovereign state’.55  
 
52 This is reflected in a surprising change of view in Mattias 
Kumm’s cosmopolitan constitutionalism. See his ‘Constituent 
Power, Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism and Post-Positivist 
Law’ (ms. 2016). 
53 It may not have been by accident that this world 
originated from Roman Catholic doctrine. See Samuel Moyn, 
Christian	 Human	 Rights (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2015). The influence of the German 
ordoliberals on this worldview, and their idea of the economic 
constitution, must also be noted, see e.g. Jayasuriya, note 1 
above.  
54 See John Rawls, Political	Liberalism (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1991); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s	 Empire 
(Harvard University Press, 1986). Cf. Paul Kahn, Four	Chapters 
on	 the	 Concept	 of	 Sovereignty (Columbia University Press, 
2011). As Kahn notes, if we ask what the figure of Hercules—
whose decisions always represent the ‘true’ meaning of the 
law—represents, do we have a better answer than ‘the 
sovereign’?, ibid 81.   
55 Neil MacCormick, ‘Beyond The Sovereign State’ (1993) 
56:1 Modern	Law	Review 1. Cf. Michael A. Wilkinson, ‘Beyond 
the Post-Sovereign State? On the Past, Present and Future of 
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B. Deliberative Democracy 
The second, related, development is the dominance in 
political theory of an ethereal account of popular 
sovereignty. This transformation is encountered in 
Habermas’ reconceptualisation of popular sovereignty 
as “procedure”.56 From there it travels with great ease 
to various intellectual laboratories of “deliberative 
democracy”.57  
The ethereal version of popular sovereignty owes a 
great deal to Habermas’s conception of 
“communicative power”, as the antagonist of 
administrative power. It is from “communicative 
power” that law ultimately obtains legitimation. 
Democracy is expressed in free-floating public debates 
that do not avail of any political centre, such as a 
parliamentary assembly. Its demands cannot be 
imputed to any collective subject but only to the 
forceless force of the better argument.  
The dialectic of the presence and absence of 
sovereignty is maintained, but at a price: the collective 
subject can assert its presence only by being dissolved 
into ideational processes of communication. 
Sovereignty is a palimpsest on the horizon of future 
agreement. In a Rechtsstaat, as reconceived from the 
 
Constitutional Pluralism’ (2019) Cambridge	 Yearbook	 of	
European	Legal	Studies 1-18.  
56 See Jürgen Habermas, Between	 Facts	 and	 Norms:	
Contributions	 to	 a	 Discourse	 Theory	 of	 Law	 and	 Democracy	
(Polity Press, 1997). 
57 See e.g. Seyla Benhabib, ‘Deliberative Rationality and 
Models of Democratic Legitimacy’ (1994) 1 Constellations 26 – 
52.  
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perspective of discourse theory, popular sovereignty 
“retreats” into the loops of communication among 
expert fora and public bodies. According to Habermas: 
Because popular sovereignty no longer circulates in a 
collectivity, or in the physically tangible presence of the 
united citizens or their assembled representatives, but 
only takes effect in the circulation of reasonably 
structured deliberations or decisions, one can attribute 
a harmless meaning to the proposition that there cannot 
be a sovereign in the constitutional state. 58 
The seat of sovereignty remains elusive if it doesn’t 
disappear altogether. No matter which institution of 
government claims to act on behalf of the people— 
even, and in particular, the legislature—the people will 
not be there. Legally constituted representative 
institutions are always under siege from free-floating 
discourses, out of which the sovereign communicative 
power of the people somehow originates.59  
With the dissolution of collective autonomy into 
the intersubjective communication of free and equals, 
popular sovereignty no longer reveals itself in agency 
but only in the rational quality of public debates. In this 
manner, theorists who purport to defend democracy 
manage to contain their fear of being disappointed in 
the actual people. Unenlightened outbursts of 
“populist” sentiments—xenophobia, racism, 
homophobia and any other classical sins of the real, 
 
58 See Habermas, note 57 at 170. 
59 For a sympathetic, but critical, perspective on Habermas, 
see William E. Scheuerman, ‘Critical Theory Beyond Habermas’ 
In Oxford	Handbook	of	Political	Theory (ed. Bonnie Honig and 
John Dryzek, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 85-105. 
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existing, ungenteel proletariat—can be easily disposed 
of as undemocratic, in violation of the Kantian spirit of 
“a people with mature reason”.60 Enlightened rule by 
the people would bear the imprint of a serious 
engagement with arguments, absence of bias or 
stereotypes, the amenability to new topics and ideas, 
equal access to all those affected and readiness to 
revise positions in light of new information. 
Sovereignty becomes unpopular. The rabble is 
dismissed!61 
C.  The empty place of power 
Legal constitutionalism and deliberative democracy 
offer a conception of sovereignty that is ethereal if not 
entirely elusive. Through the displacement of 
disagreement and political conflict, they lay the ground 
for the transnationalisation and eventual 
transcendence of sovereignty. The philosophical basis 
of this move is the severing of reason from action. 
 
60 Jörke & Selk, note 16, 485, 491, observe correctly that 
moral indignation has become the chief liberal response to 
populism. They point out correctly that this is regrettable, for it 
misses the mark of mature democratic politics which is to 
tolerate and to accommodate views of others in spite of moral 
disagreement.  
61 On the significance of the rabble for Hegel, see, Frank 
Ruda, Hegel’s	Rabble:	An	Investigation	into	Hegel’s	Philosophy	of	
Right	(London: Bloomsbury, 2011). Hegel uses the figure of the 
‘rabble’ to capture the tendency of bourgeoise society and 
industrial capitalism to lead to extremes of inequality and 
instability. From this perspective it would appear to be no 
surprise that the rabble, having been dismissed, turns to non-
liberal alternatives.  
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Undergirding it is a powerful metaphor, that in the 
modern political form of democracy, the place of 
power is ‘empty’.62 This is a conception of authority 
articulated by Claude Lefort.63  
Lefort takes the emphasis on the absence of the 
represented to its extreme. Popular sovereignty in this 
tradition becomes a fiction. It not only loses its 
mooring in a people; its appearances are demoted to 
mere figments, and dangerous ones at that. 
Sovereignty cannot claim to stand for anything 
essentially public any longer. Claims on its behalf just 
represent some private interests among others.  
Lefort acknowledges that modern democracy is 
based on the idea of popular sovereignty but observes 
that the democratic concept of sovereign power is 
markedly different from the monarchical concept as a 
mode of symbolic representation. In this view, “[…] the 
image of popular sovereignty is linked to the image of 
an empty place.”64  
Ostensibly, this assertion presupposes the contrast 
to a period, prior to modern democracy, when the 
 
62 On the link between Habermas and Lefort see Stefan 
Rummens, ‘Deliberation Interrupted: Confronting Jürgen 
Habermas with Claude Lefort’ (2008) 34 Philosophy	and	Social	
Criticism 383 – 408, noting structural similarities and in 
particular how the proceduralisation of popular sovereignty 
provides a discourse-theoretical interpretation of the empty 
place of power.  
63 For a short introduction, see Sofia Näsström, 
‘Representative Democracy as Tautology: Ankersmit and Lefort 
on Representation’ (2008) 5 European	 Journal	 of	 Political	
Theory 321-342, at 327-329. 
64 Lefort, note 21 at 279. 
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place of sovereignty was occupied by someone or 
something. This was called a king, a monarch or a 
prince. With the demise of monarchy, the chair of 
sovereignty—the throne—is no longer taken.65 
This observation loses its apparent triviality when 
one considers that it concerns the symbolic order. It is 
relevant for what we believe those wielding public 
power to embody.  
In the case of the ancient regime, the monarch is 
considered to personify plenipotentiary power; he or 
she is the steward of the nomos of God’s order. One is 
a consequence of the other. The person in charge of 
sustaining the nomos must have full power, but such 
power must be used only in order to realise the order 
that is God’s eternal will. The monarch is above 
positive law only because he is sub lege vis-à-vis 
natural law or immemorial custom. The power of the 
monarch “[…] points towards an unconditional, other-
worldly pole”.66  
Lefort conjures up, in this context, Kantorowicz’s 
theory of the “king’s two bodies”. The order 
maintained by the person of the monarch is the corpus 
mysticum of the realm. The mortal body of the person 
incarnates the immortal body.67 Within the order of 
the immortal body each is assigned to his or her proper 
place.68 Owing to the order’s root in the lex aeterna 
 
65 Claude Lefort, Democracy	and	Political	Theory (trans. D. 
Macey, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988) at 17. 
66 Lefort, note 66 at 17. 
67 See Lefort, note 21 at 302-303. 
68 See Lefort, note 21 at 303. 
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each person’s social place is tied to an unconditional 
foundation. The order is known as lex	naturalis, which 
is, according to Augustin’s sublime image, the imprint 
left by the lex	aeterna in the human soul.  
The advent of modern democracy marks the 
demise of this medieval imaginary. The corpus 
mysticum, the order, becomes bereft of its substance 
and its foundation. Everything is up for grabs. Nobody 
can claim to have any firm knowledge of the right 
order of social life. Politics is henceforth based not 
upon knowledge but on ideology, which is, whatever 
else it might be, less overwhelming and foundational 
than the natural law.69  
Lefort points to this transformation by saying that 
democracy is an “ungraspable society”, the identity of 
which is constantly open to question. All practical 
knowledge is generated against a background of 
“fundamental indeterminacy”.70 This means, in other 
words, that society is no longer symbolically 
represented in the form of a preordained plan or 
normative blueprint. Contingency and choice emerge 
from social conflicts. Some win, others lose. The people 
 
69 Ideology admits of crisis and hence critique, particularly 
when viewed against the real, material conditions of existence. 
See Michael A. Wilkinson, ‘Public Law and the Autonomy of the 
Political: A Materialist Critique’ In Questioning	the	Foundations	
of	 Public	 Law (ed. M. Wilkinson & ;´M. Dowdle, Oxford: Hart, 
2018) 181. Lefort’s space apparently remains empty also in the 
sense of unfilled by concentrations of private power, neglecting 
the totalising tendencies of modern capitalism (see Wilkinson, 
ibid).  
70 Lefort, note 66 at 19.  
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cannot be “one”, for they lack any substance. They are 
always divided. Lefort belabours this point so strongly 
that his social imaginary threatens to become 
nihilistic. Implicit in social practice is “a process of 
questioning”, but no one can credibly claim to have the 
right answer to any of the questions being asked.71  
This perplexing diagnosis bespeaks Lefort’s 
interest in explaining how the normative 
indeterminacy of a democratic society gives rise to a 
craving for a totalitarian closure that would all of a 
sudden reunite society with a final goal, structure or 
harmony. It would then encounter opposition, if at all, 
only from external enemies.72 Totalitarianism 
promises us “the People-as-One”.73 It also provides us 
with identifications: The party “is” the proletariat, the 
proletariat “is” the last class, the last class “is” the 
people at the end of history. Democracy is the opposite 
of such unity. It is division all the way down:74  
[D]emocratic society is instituted as a society without a 
body, as a society which undermines the representation 
of an organic unity. 
 
71 See ibid. This means that the question of “this is who we 
are and what ought to be” cannot be settled.  
72 See Lefort, note 21 at 305. 
73 See Lefort, note 21 at 297; note 66 at 12, 20. 
74 Lefort, note 66 at 18. As Nässtrom, note 57 at 350 puts it: 
“There is no unity at the bottom of democracy, only a reference 
to a people that itself remains divided.” Populism is often 
conceptualised in opposition to this idea, refering to the people 
as “one” and reclaiming the empty place for this very entity. See 
Corrias, note 14 at 20-21; Blokker, note 14 at 117, 123. 
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Not by accident, then, the demise of the mystical body 
affects the role of the physical body, that is, the 
symbolic significance of the real representative. The 
democratic sovereign is internally pluralistic and 
always divided. Democracy is possible only on the 
basis of representation.75 But the representative 
cannot claim to represent unity or to speak with the 
authority that accrues from speaking on behalf of the 
people. In this scenario,76   
[P]ower belongs to no one, except to the people in the 
abstract.  
D. All-Affected Interests 
The “the people in the abstract”, however, is nothing 
other than the unsaturated identity of a people that is 
prior to the political unit. It is just the nation stripped 
of its national identity, stripped of its history, of its 
political and material struggles for democracy and 
over its meaning. This incidental negative nationalism 
is the mirror-image of the explicit nationalism of 
presence, replacing an untenable concrete order with 
an equally untenable empty abstraction. 
This dilemma raises the paradox of democracy.77 
To choose democratically the bounds and composition 
of a democratic polity presupposes a proto-democracy 
the credentials of which, failing an indefinite regress, 
 
75 See Näsström, note 63 at 322. 
76 Lefort, above note 66 at 15. 
77 For a highly useful discussion of the relevant problems, 
see Sarah Song, ‘The boundary problem in democratic theory: 
why the demos should be bounded by the state’ (2012) 4 
International	Theory 39-68. 
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must be indeterminate.78 The only regress-stopper 
appears to be history. There seems to be no way of 
getting around the historical contingency of actual 
peoples, a conclusion which appears to infect all 
democracies with a foundational paradox: an absence 
of self-determination.79 Democracies must necessarily 
be suspected of perpetuating the imperfect conditions 
from which they have originated. From the perspective 
of a theory of justice, historical contingency is always 
potentially embarrassing. A people might plausibly be 
taken to be composed of those sharing exposure to the 
coercive apparatus of the state. But owing to its 
narrow focus, such a principle of peoplehood is 
vulnerable to an obvious critique. Why limit the scope 
of the people to those who are potentially or actually 
 
78 As way out of this paradox Hans Agné claims that 
humanity at large is only legitimate and self-authenticating 
constituency. See Hans Agné, ‘Why Democracy must be Global: 
Self-Founding and Democratic Intervention’ (2010) 2 
International	 Theory 381-409. The question is, however, 
whether a global “democracy” would indeed be sufficiently 
democratic in its operation. It is likely subject to capture by 
special interests and dominance by a hegemon. Communication 
would be next to impossible. Solidarity would likely be only 
very poorly developed. See Song, note 78 at 61-62. 
79 See Sofia Nasstrom, ‘The Legitimacy of the People’ (2007) 
35 Political	 Theory 624-658 at 653: ”[…] [T]he reference to 
history does not seem to make the demands for legitimacy fade 
away, and particularly not today. For why should we accept the 
community in which we live simply because we were born into 
it? What if I think that the present boundaries of the people 
privilege some individuals at the expense of others? Am I not 
then, as free and equal individual, entitled to ask for its 
legitimacy?” 
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more permanently subject to coercion while many 
others are otherwise and less directly affected by 
governmental action? And why view the state 
necessarily restricted to a national government? 
Shouldn’t one include also global governance 
institutions, be they of public or private pedigree? In 
contemporary conditions of European integration, for 
example, the endorsement of freedom of movement 
and the idea that political membership should be 
derivative of social membership, such as the status of 
a permanently employed person, suggests peoplehood 
emerges from flexible and shifting market 
participation.80 
Some have attempted to overcome this aporia 
through the principle of All-Affected Interests. 
Ostensibly, the All-Affected Interests Principle offers 
an inclusive solution to the paradox of democracy, a 
principled way of filling the empty abstraction. 
According to this principle, collective decisions are 
legitimate only if all affected persons had an 
opportunity to participate in the process leading up to 
their adoption.81  
 
80 This is the ethos of much contemporary work on the 
question of de-nationalising “belonging”. See, for example, 
Yasemin Nohoglu Soyal,	 Limits	 of	 Citizenship.	 Migrants	 and	
Postnational	 Membership	 in	 Europe (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994); Dora Kostakopoulou, The	 Future	
Governance	 of	 Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008). 
81 See Ian Shapiro, Democratic	 Justice (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1999) at 37. 
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Applied to a world where political spaces are still 
bounded it implies that political communities would 
have to expand and contract depending on the number 
of stakeholders affected by a decision. Although posing 
practical obstacles, it seems to be the next logical step 
of inclusion after the transcendence of the national 
people of modern popular sovereignty. In light of this 
principle, what lends unity to the “people” are the 
decisions that affect them.  
The All-Affected Interests Principle complements 
legal constitutionalism and deliberative democracy. 
Processes of justification and consultation lend 
themselves to accommodate the flexible expansion 
and contraction of the stakeholder constituency. In 
such a world, individuals are to yield to whomever 
possesses the capacity to tackle their personal 
problems most effectively. Indeed, with a special focus 
on policy externalities,82 this principle has become 
central to justificatory discourses of European 
integration, and beyond.83 
IV. The severance of constitutional reason from 
action 
Contemporary constitutional theories that lend their 
support to legal constitutionalism and deliberative 
democracy profess impeccable enlightenment 
credentials. They avoid the pitfalls of explicit 
 
82 There is no theory of permissible externalities. See 
Alexander Somek, note 45. 
83 See Alexander Somek, ‘The Darling Dogma of Bourgeois 
Europeanists’ (2014) 20 European	Law	Journal 688-712. 
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nationalism or populism. They are also high-minded, 
demonstrating regard for how national policies spill 
over into foreign territory and affect those who have 
not had an opportunity to voice their concerns or 
disagreement. They believe that constituencies should 
be composed of members of civil society and never 
exclude potential incoming members on arbitrary 
grounds.  The logical outcome is to oust individual and 
collective action altogether and to replace them with 
the hypothetical representation of discourses, asking 
merely what we would agree to under ideal conditions. 
This exhibits a penchant for disempowerment.  
Contemporary constitutional theory tends toward 
democratic self-flagellation and even exhibits a 
perverse joy in disempowering “the” people. Counting 
votes supposedly fails to represent discourses 
adequately. Debating is good, but national 
democracies had better abstain from making 
decisions, not least because their actions create 
externalities for others. Whenever real democracies do 
something they are already guilty of something. Doing 
equals failing. Lefort’s incidental negative nationalism 
presents us with a demos that is devoid of an identity 
and a history and that has no plan for a future society. 
The place of power is and must remain unoccupied. 
Nobody can legitimately invoke the authority of the 
people. Whoever tried would be guilty of a scam, or 
worse, of being a ‘populist’.84  
 
84 See Jörke & Selk, note 16, at 492, who are critical of the 
widespread moral aversion to populism. Not only does it 
reconfirm widespread populist belief about the haughtiness and 
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Much contemporary democratic theory manifests, 
in Hegelian terms, a moral view of the world.85 It 
occupies a position of judging without acting.86 Action, 
however, is unavoidable. We cannot but act.87 Judging 
action by abstaining from it fails the test of 
universalisation. In any case, judging is action, too, and 
therefore, necessarily, bad. The moral view of the 
world must thus confess to its own immorality.  
In light of this inconsistency, legal 
constitutionalism and deliberative democracy have to 
be viewed as symptoms. Symptoms are responses to 
 
irresponsiveness of elites, it ignores that right-wing populism 
originates from a situation in which the fears of those who have 
lost out are not represented and dismissed as originating from 
the cultural backwaters of society. Bugaric also makes the 
important point that liberal moralist aversion to populism is 
suspect since populism may be an understandable response to 
the destructive forces of free market logic.  A non-authoritarian 
(left) populism may thus be justified on the basis of generating 
an alternative to the political economy of neoliberalism, Bojan 
Bugaric, ‘Could Populism be Good for Constitutional 
Democracy?’ (2019) Annual	Review	of	Law	and	Social	Science 41 
– 58. More explicitly, see Chantal Mouffe, For	a	Left	Populism 
(London: Verso, 2018).  
85 See G.W.F. Hegel, The	Phenomenology	of	the	Spirit (trans. 
A.V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
86 From the position of the moral view of the world, one 
criticises others for their actions. Actually, one does not criticise 
only those actions that are bad while praising others that are 
good, one rather finds something bad in any action, for the point 
of judging is to make action as	such morally defective. 
87 With this simple assertion Korsgaard embarks on her 
grand intellectual enterprise. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Self-
Constitution:	 Agency,	 Identity,	 and	 Integrity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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conditions. They are, however, failures; they do not 
resolve conflicts and are prone to give rise to further 
conflicts.88 Both exemplars of contemporary 
democratic theory represent unsuccessful responses 
to the conflict between equality and political agency. 
Underlying their failure is the transformation of the 
people into an entity that is incapable of engaging in 
action. The equal votes of citizens acting within a 
bounded constituency are taken to undermine the 
rhizomatic nature of the people dispersed in various 
unbounded fora and action groups. 
Lefort’s people in the abstract89 still tacitly 
identifies the people with the nation. But it renders any 
actual people radically absent. Not even the connection 
that is established by means of an election can 
guarantee that a representative body speaks with 
greater authority for the people than the voices that 
originate from civil society.90  
Implementation of the All-Affected Interest 
Principle would make composition of the participating 
demos policy dependent.91 The demos would have to 
be flexibly adjusted with an eye to the proposed impact 
of a policy. The result is that sovereign powers become 
issue-specific, fleeting or a product of impact 
assessments. Sovereign, so it seems, is he who is 
 
88 See Sigmund Freud, Vorlesungen	 zur	 Einführung	 in	 die	
Psychoanalyse	(13th ed, FrankfurtaM: Fischer Verlag 2004) at 
247. 
89 See above note 77. 
90 See Sofia Näsström, ‘Democratic Representation Beyond 
Election’ (2015) 22 Constellations 1-12, at 1. 
91 On the following, see Song, note 78 at 57. 
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adversely affected, or who can provide reason for this 
claim.  
But who assesses the impact assessment relevant 
for the selection of stakeholders? As an institution, the 
papacy is heavily involved in seeing the principles of 
Christian ethics observed. Should the Pope have a say 
on the Irish decision to repeal the Eighth Amendment 
to their constitution and legalize abortion? And since 
the principle is concerned with being affected, it would 
seem to require giving greater voice to those who are 
more intensely affected.92 Who is elected as the 
President of the United States may have far greater 
impact on the lives of people in Syria, Libya, Iraq and 
Iran than on the lives of Americans. To a large extent 
their survival is intertwined with this question. Should 
they not only be given a vote in the elections but 
actually be given two or three ballots considering how 
much is at stake?  
There are no easy answers unless it were conceded 
that everyone is equally affected by allocations of 
political authority. Thus understood, the All-Affected 
Interest principle would presuppose a global demos as 
the ultimate seat of sovereign power. It is no 
coincidence that Habermas himself sees the 
postnational constitutionalism of the EU as a stepping 
stone to the constitution of the world society.93  
 
92 As Näsström observes, the democratic ideal of counting 
equally is replaced with a model of “distribution according to 
stakes”. Näsström, note 64 at 358. 
93 Jürgen Habermas, The	 Postnational	 Constellation 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2001). 
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In practice, the principle of All-Affected Interests 
reinforces the individualistic liberal illusion according 
to which people live their lives in isolation from one 
another, united only by sheer contingency, because 
they happen to have the same self-interest or like 
encounters with state power. Accountability would be 
allocated across a potentially infinitely wide field of 
different sites of governing. True democratic 
legitimacy resides only in the weak publics that must 
not grow into collective subjects; they must refrain 
from action.  
The resulting diffuseness and complexity would 
likely result in widespread disempowerment and 
disengagement from political affairs, at least for all 
except the select few of the frequent-flyer class or 
those with the capacity to affect policy through 
influencing the dispersed fora of public opinion.94 This 
is a world composed of individuals and bureaucrats. It 
is the world where incidental negative nationalism is 
accompanied by accidental cosmopolitanism.95 
As an ensemble, legal constitutionalism, 
deliberative democracy, the ‘empty place of power’ 
and the All-Affected Interests principle results in a 
dismantling of the people and of the idea of constituent 
power. The flexible demos might oppose discrete 
policies, but is in no position to challenge a 
government as such. How could it ever see itself as 
 
94 See e.g. Peter Mair, Ruling	the	Void:	The	Hollowing	Out	of	
Western	Democracies (London: Verso, 2013).  
95 See Alexander Somek, ‘Accidental Cosmopolitanism’ 
(2012) 3 Transnational	Legal	Theory	371–393. 
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constituting a new one? The overall effect on 
democracy appears nothing short of devastating. 
The people in the abstract are, of course, no one in 
particular and, in indeed, they are no-body. We appear 
to have arrived by a different route at Arendt’s 
conception of bureaucracy, that most dangerous form 
of rule where nobody rules, and the other side of the 
same coin, where nobody is responsible.96 Is this a 
condition in which political authority itself is in danger 
of disappearing?97 
V. Reuniting reason and action 
We have, so far, examined two contrasting models of 
sovereignty and uncovered their suppositions. The 
first explicitly embraces popular sovereignty as 
nationalism. The second ties itself to the ethereal 
views of legal constitutionalism and deliberative 
democracy, underpinned by a philosophical discourse 
that empties power of any discernable content. As a 
result sovereignty becomes unpopular, and 
democracy is turned into an abstraction. While the 
nationalist response perceives the people as always 
and already constituted by some pre-political factor, 
such as history, religion, language or race, the second 
avoids pulling the people together into one entity, at 
the cost of severing reason from action.  
 
96 See Hannah Arendt, On	 Violence (New York: Harcourt, 
1970).  
97 See Hannah Arendt, Between	 Past	 and	 Future:	 Eight	
Exercises	in	Political	Thought (London: Penguin, 2006). 
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In the remainder of this article it will be argued that 
the substance of democracy is less determinate than 
the first, but less indeterminate than the second 
suggests.98 There is an ordering of power, at least 
when viewed teleologically, but this is not determined 
in a pre-political manner.  
A. From disunity to faith in the power of action 
This can be explained with an eye to the point at which 
Lefort heads off into the wrong direction. This happens 
when he explains the significance of universal 
suffrage:99 
The danger of numbers is greater than the danger of an 
intervention by the masses on the political scene; the 
idea of a number as such is opposed to the idea of the 
substance of society. Numbers break down unity, 
destroy identity.  
There is some soundness in this observation. To count 
numbers of votes in order to arrive at a binding 
decision contradicts the identification of an authority 
that is committed to a plan or an order of things. Equal 
votes (one person, one vote) is the form in which 
“disincorporated individuals” articulate their views. In 
contrast to how members of estates (e.g., the members 
of the gentry or burghers) speak for their group from 
within the group’s point of view, universal suffrage 
severs voters from their societal station and casts 
them as socially deracinated individuals.100  
 
98 See Lefort, note 66 at 15 (on welcoming and preserving 
indeterminacy); Lefort, note 21 at 305. 
99 Lefort, note 21 at 303. 
100 See also Corrias, note 15 at 20-21. 
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But Lefort draws the wrong conclusion. That those 
count who happen to be part of the greater number is 
indicative of a deeper commitment.101 It is the 
commitment to collective action even if this involves 
surrendering one’s own voting preferences. What 
lends democracy unity is manifest, at any rate 
implicitly, in the defeated minority yielding to the 
majority. A submission of this kind suggests that, after 
all, to be part of the larger society is more important to 
them than to prevail in a particular vote. What unites 
citizens, from that perspective, is their overriding 
interest in effective collective action, in asserting their 
power vis-à-vis historically given circumstances of 
action.102  
 
101 See Näsström, note 64 at 349. ‘The difficulty with Lefort’s 
analysis of democracy’ notes Ernesto Laclau,  ‘is that it is 
concentrated exclusively on liberal-democratic regimes, and 
does not pay due attention to the construction of popular-
democratic subjects.’ E. Laclau, On	 Populist	 Reason (London 
Verso, 2005), 166. As Laclau continues in his critique of Lefort, 
‘emptiness is not just a datum of constitutional, it is a political 
construction’, ibid, 170.    
102 A reviewer of this article pressed us hard to admit that, 
at least in our view, successful democratic action presupposes 
pre-existing bounded units, such as, in particular, the nation. 
While it cannot be denied that the effectiveness of action is 
greatly facilitated if the existence of a collective unit is mutally 
taken for granted by those exercising agency, one should not 
overlook that any appeal to such unit involves an act of 
interpretive construction. It is perhaps the greatest mystery of 
sovereign authority that it has to be self-authenticating. 
Someone has to speak or act on behalf of a “we” and others have 
to allow that person to go forward. This is true of appeals to a 
“nation” and even more so of the former pretensions of elite 
parties. Put in terms of American pragmatist philosophy, this 
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On the basis of this elementary idea an 
understanding of popular sovereignty can be 
developed that does not treat is as a status, but as an 
activity. The activity is directed at a specific goal or 
goals. And it is risky. Attaining the objective 
necessarily involves the endorsement of a principle 
that could equally well thwart it. 
This understanding of sovereignty can be 
developed from canonical sources of political 
modernity: the social contract traditions of Hobbes 
and Rousseau.103 It is marked by three elements. 
First, sovereignty has a telos, which is, in the case of 
Hobbes, self-preservation; 104  in the case of Rousseau, 
it is self-legislation. 105  It need by no means exhaust 
itself in these. On the contrary, popular sovereignty 
may be geared towards emancipation from any form of 
 
means that the identity of publics is dynamically constituted in 
view of challenges. It is not a given but a by-product of joint 
agency. See John Dewey, The	 Public	 and	 its	 Problems (3rd ed. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954) at 64. It remains 
sociologically the case that the levers of effective and 
accountable political power are exercisable predominantly at 
the national level. See eg Streeck, note 19, above. 
103 We have relied on an online version that is available at 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobbes/
Leviathan.pdf. On the importance of democratic sovereignty to 
Hobbes, and the continuitiues between Hobbes and Rousseau, 
see Richard Tuck, The	 Sleeping	 Sovereign:	 The	 Invention	 of	
Modern	Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 137 – 
141.  
104 Hobbes, ibid, ch. XXI (p. 136), XVII (p. 81). Rousseau, note 
24 above.  
105 See Rousseau, note 23 above. 
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oppression, to avoid succumbing to circumstances that 
individuals or groups cannot control.  
Second, with regard to its objective, sovereignty 
has a mode of operation that depends upon a form of 
representation. The attainment of goals depends on 
giving the sovereign agents full authority to achieve 
the objective by their own lights. Again, in the case of 
popular sovereignty this is manifest in the 
commitment to majoritarianism.106  
Third, since the attainment of the telos involves 
choosing such an inherently risky means, sovereign 
authority requires a great deal of confidence and trust, 
which implies a special form of political citizenship.107  
These core features of popular sovereignty will be 
further elaborated in turn. 
B. Emancipation 
The telos of popular sovereignty is what can be 
accomplished only by joint political action. Most 
generally, people act together in order to overcome 
oppression by some group or by circumstances that 
may appear to be beyond their control. This task may 
 
106 In Hobbes’ case this is the conversion of an obligation to 
protect into an unlimited right to rule. Hobbes’ arguments as to 
why it is inconceivable that the people conclude a contract with 
the sovereign are rather formal. See Hobbes, note 104 ch. XVIII 
(p. 81).  
107 Although in Leviathan, Hobbes suggests monarchies as 
the best sovereigns, ch. XIX (pp. 118-119), Tuck shows that 
Hobbes’s views on the whole (including his earlier works) are 
more nuanced, particularly when one keeps in mind the 
distinction between sovereignty and government, Tuck, note 
103 above, 86 – 120. 
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have been envisaged by Marx under the name of 
“human emancipation”.108 It stands for the organised 
effort to rise above, from below, the shackles created 
by mutual dependence.  
The constraints inherent in the horizontal 
competition in market contexts not only tie us 
together; they also tie us down. Economic 
interdependence in conditions of capitalism restricts 
human freedom through the coercion of economic 
circumstance. When economic interdependence 
dominates, people have their opportunities 
determined on the basis of the side-effects of 
horizontal transactions.  
Being governed by the coercive force of economic 
circumstance is tantamount to being subject to an 
anonymous and alien force.109 This is akin to what 
Cornelius Castoriadis, in an attempt to renew the 
republican tradition as a radical democratic project, 
 
108 Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question’ in Early	 Writings 
(London: Penguin 2000). 
109 For this reason Rousseau’s insights on sovereignty as 
representing the ‘General Will’ in combination with his work on 
political economy are crucial to move beyond the Hobbesian 
framework. On the broader requirements of equality in 
Rousseau’s republic, see Frederick Neuhouser, Rousseau’s	
Critique	 of	 Inequality:	 Reconstructing	 the	 Second	 Discourse 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 129-130, 
134. On Rousseau’s radical constitutionalism and political 
economy, see Marco Goldoni, ‘Rousseau’s Radical 
Constitutionalism and its Legacy’ in M. Dowdle and M. 
Wilkinson (eds.) Constitutionalism	 Beyond	 Liberalism 
(Cambridge Universty Press, 2017) 227 -254.  
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calls a heteronomous society.110 The outside and 
uncontrollable force may no longer be conceived as 
divine in modernity, it is immanent. But if it remains 
elusive, outwith our grasp, as, for example, conveyed 
in the metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market, 
unfreedom is entailed. A force that is not yours makes 
you do what you would not want were you invested 
with the full freedom that would accrue from rising 
with others above mere market interdependence.111 
The coercive effect of the market and the powerful 
force it exerts originate from our common failure to do 
something about it. In other words, the collectively felt 
impact of an	alien	force is the upshot of our failure to 
arrive at a common	will.  
There is no guarantee, to be sure, that society could 
ever succeed at ensuring each a fully authentic life and 
autonomous existence. But there is no reason to 
assume that human beings are incapable of creating 
 
110 See e.g. Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘Democracy as Procedure 
and Democracy as Regime’ (1997) 4 Constellations 1 – 18. 
111 As is well known, Marx observed that the cause of the 
loss of control over one’s own life is the profoundly 
disempowering effect of competition: Karl Marx & Friedrich 
Engels, Die	Deutsche	Ideologie, MEW vol 3. (Berlin: Dietz, 1978) 
at 76. In English translation: “This accidental character is only 
engendered and developed by competition and the struggle of 
individuals among themselves. Thus, in imagination, individuals 
seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, 
because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of 
course, they are less free, because they are more subjected to 
the violence of things.” The source of the translation is 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german
-ideology/ch01d.htm. 
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arrangements where effective autonomy were 
realised.112  
The momentum for transcending interdependence 
ideally originates from those who are most adversely 
affected by it and able to conceive its injustice. In the 
Marxist tradition, this is the class whose labour 
produces surplus value, which is free to sell its labour 
but also forced to sell it, having no other commodity 
for sale.113 The vulnerability of the working class 
accounts for its status as a special class. But since, as a 
matter of normative principle, this class merely acts 
upon the universally alienating features of 
interdependence it also advances a universal interest 
in emancipation from economic necessity. 
C. Majoritarianism 
According to Hobbes, for the sovereign to provide for 
peace and security it has to possess unrestrained 
public authority. The mode of operation of sovereignty 
is paradoxical, however, since it does not admit of any 
checks on how the sovereign might go about attaining 
these objectives.114 The only “check” is abject failure 
itself, for if the sovereign fails to avert the condition of 
war among its subjects, their inalienable right to self-
defence is fully revived.115  
 
112 ‘Effective autonomy’ as Castoriadis has it, means 
freedom ‘not only in the letter of the law, but in effective social 
actuality’, note 111, 112.    
113 Karl Marx, Capital	Vol	1, Ch. 6 (London: Penguin, 1990).  
114 See Hobbes, note 103 ch. XVIII (p. 109). 
115 See Hobbes, note 103 ch. XIV (p. 81-82).  
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In the case of popular sovereignty, the equivalence 
of unlimited power is the power that accrues from 
outnumbering others. This formal constraint aside, it 
is just as unchecked as Hobbes’ sovereign.  
The significance of this idea is thrown into sharp 
relief when one considers that it is based on rejecting 
the pretensions of the “better sort” or some version of 
aristocracy. Nobody who wishes to pass as a member 
of a people can rightfully claim to possess superior 
judgment to any other on political matters. In relation 
to one another, opinions reduce themselves to mere 
votes. For the only condition under which a minority 
could rightfully demand from the majority that it do as 
it says would be some assurance that the minority 
possesses superior insight. As a matter of normative 
principle, this condition can only obtain in a 
democracy if the majority has determined it to be so, 
for example by identifying agents with special 
expertise. By default, however, the people have to 
come to action without violating the equality 
principle.116 We therefore arrive at majority rule.  
There is not necessarily a logical basis for 
majoritarianism.117 But it is important to understand 
 
116 On the connetion between majoritarianism and the 
equality principle, see Jeremy Waldron, Law	and	Disagreement 
(Oxford University Press, 1999) 101 – 118.   
117 The Condorcet jury theorem is, of course, an attempt to 
establish a positive correlation between the views of the 
majority and insight into truth. It is of no relevance to what is 
being advanced here. For an elaboration of its significance in a 
constitutional context, see Adrian Vermeule, Law	and	the	Limits	
of	Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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that it is a principle of practical reason where reason 
has to be exercised collectively. It marks the point at 
which the quality of arguments is transmuted into 
quantity, or numerousness. In contrast to the moral 
view of the world, getting to action by means of 
counting is an exercise of political judgment.118  
A majority are politically right on account of being 
many, and not on the ground of some absolute quality 
of their arguments, their elevated position, their 
celebrity status, their good education, their 
professional credentials, their money or their 
networking skills. In their judgment, which may or 
may not result from “better arguments”, “superior 
insight” or “greater expertise”, the rule of the majority 
is as unlimited as the sovereignty envisaged in the 
Leviathan. It is, therefore, just as dangerous. It 
bespeaks a mode of operation just as paradoxical as 
that of absolute power. Majoritarian democracy, 
which, by design, is the political means of those who 
can only help themselves by virtue of being many, can 
of course be put to malign uses. One should not 
harbour any illusions.119 But there is no reason to think 
the dangers are any greater than in any other mode of 
governing where power ends up being in the hands of 
a few.  
 
118 For a powerful argument for majoritarianism based on 
agency as well as some responses to the standard concerns, see 
Tuck, above note 103, 257 – 266.  
119 See Kumm, note 52. 
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D. Citizenship 
Sovereignty is best viewed against the backdrop of 
emancipation from the “systemic imperatives” of 
money and power, as clarified by the early 
Habermas.120 Since the ultimate focus of popular 
sovereignty rests on human life in conditions of social 
and economic interdependence it follows that 
members of a people—citizens, that is—address the 
overall situation of society and concern themselves 
with a whole form of life.121  
This explains why citizens are distinct from 
stakeholders. Stakeholders take an interest in an 
organization inasmuch as it provides them with a 
service.122 Viewing the polity from a stakeholder’s 
perspective involves asking, typically, whether, as an 
individual, one receives a return on one’s “taxpayer’s 
money”. Viewing the polity from the perspective of a 
 
120 Jürgen Habermas, The	Structural	Transformation	of	 the	
Public	 Sphere:	 Inquiry	 into	 a	 Category	 of	 Bourgeoise	 Society 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).  
121 In a similar vein, Christiano reconstructs democratic 
citizenship as a position from which everyone has a “roughly 
equal stake” in sustaining a common world that is supposed to 
provide a “home” for those who inhabit it. See Thomas 
Christiano, ‘A Democratic Theory of Territory and Some Puzzles 
about Global Democracy’ (2006) 37 Journal	of	Social	Philosophy 
81-107, at 84, 88. 
122 It is no coincidence that Raz’s ‘service conception of 
authority’ explicitly rejects the significance of democracy or 
even any special political relationship between rulers and ruled. 
See Joseph Raz, ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the 
Service Conception’ (2006) 90 Minnesota	 Law	Review 1003 – 
1044.   
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citizen, by contrast, engages our social imagination. As 
a citizen one is invested with the power to create and 
sustain something greater than the particular set of 
practices in which one happens to be engaged every 
day. For example, the question of whether or not the 
school curriculum should offer ancient Greek matters 
to a stakeholder only in so far as she “has a stake” in 
having this language studied by her children. People 
without children, by contrast, have no stake. 
Citizenship, however, invests everyone with the power 
to co-determine whether or not there ought to be a 
social world in which the study of ancient languages is 
saved from extinction. Why should this matter? It 
matters precisely because it allows citizens to rise 
above their private existence and to participate in 
creating something that they can create, and sustain, 
only once they transcend the shackles of economic 
interdependence.123  
 
123 In the same context, Christiano, note 121, at 84, speaks 
of a “common world”. This is a world “[…] in which the 
fulfillment of all or nearly all of the fundamental interests of 
each person are [sic] connected with the fulfillment of all or 
nearly all of the fundamental interests of very other person. This 
world is marked by a deep interdependence of interests among 
the members.” This explains also why territoriality matters to 
sovereignty. A state is a territory in virtue of its ability to 
exercise relatively comprehensive control over forms of life. 
Such a control is undoubtedly indispensible, for otherwise 
interdependence could scarcely be held in check. But it is not 
territoriality alone that explains why popular sovereignty and 
the state are a perfect match. The state can guarantee the 
effective enjoyment of rights. States are also the sites of 
solidarity and trust. They are the places where representation 
can be relatively responsive. See Song, above, at 58-59. 
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The practice of citizenship as a third feature of 
sovereignty also reveals its inherently risky nature. 
Engaging in common action with others can be 
effective only so long as one can be reasonably assured 
that others with whom one acts or whom one permits 
to act on one’s behalf share one’s view of the world. 
Credible commitments to political programs that look 
into the future may invite the relevant trust and 
reciprocity. But such trust may equally well also be 
instilled by defending past achievements or traditions. 
In that case, collective identity serves as the source of 
trustworthiness. This explains why, unless politics 
avails of a forward-looking political program, 
backward-looking nationalist political forces are likely 
to absorb the energies of defiance that the people can 
muster.124  
The predicament of our time appears to be that 
such future-oriented programmes are difficult to 
imagine, but this is a symptom of the de-popularising 
of sovereignty that we have outlined above.  
VI. Conclusion 
The sceptical reservations with which this paper 
began have not been fully met. Sovereign states do not 
de	 facto rule supreme over their territory. 
Supranational authorities and private or informal 
 
124 As both Jörke & Selk, note 16 at 488, 496 and Möller, note 
16 434 point out, what explains, at least partly, the appeal of 
populist movements is that they overcome the “dictatorship of 
no alternatives” and reinvigorate transformative political action 
in the midst of ordinary politics.  
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transnational regulatory regimes have taken charge of 
important areas of public policy, such as education, 
banking and economic crisis management. Beyond the 
state, there appears to be little space for the people to 
rise above their interdependence. Inside of nation 
states, however, the scope left for political power has 
become remarkably narrow. This is reaching breaking 
point in the case of European integration. In an 
apposite diagnosis of the European Union, to 
paraphrase Peter Mair, states now have politics but no 
policies, and the EU has policies but no politics.125 The 
resulting stalemate causes all manner of morbid 
symptoms to occur.  
Yet, there are moments—moments that we have 
seen in e.g. Greece, in Spain, in the UK, and further 
afield, in Hong Kong—where the people disavow their 
allegiance to arrangements that outside authorities, 
expert bodies and cooperating governments have 
prepared for them. They stand up and claim they are 
no longer willing to put up with the system. Elites reply 
by saying what elites typically say to those who oppose 
them, namely, that the people do not understand the 
issues, fail to appreciate their complexity or behave 
irresponsibly and irreverently. And yet, it is in 
opposition to the haughty pretensions of transnational 
governors that the crowd, the commoners, the demos, 
provide instances of popular sovereignty.126 Their 
 
125 See Mair, note 95. 
126 In its original meaning the demos were the lower classes, 
the poor, those who had ‘no part in anything’. See Jacques 
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resistance preserves the moment in which 
numerousness translates into authority in a manner 
which cannot be ignored. No matter what economic 
rationality appears to dictate, the people renounce 
their readiness to endure the status quo. The 
categorical nature with which ordinary people express 
their indignation is an assertion of popular 
sovereignty. At the risk of sounding French,127 one 
could say that popular sovereignty is not a status. It is 
an occurrence. It is enacted in and through certain 





Ranciere, Disagreement:	 Politics	 and	 Philosophy (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 8 - 11.  
127 The allusion is, of course, to Alain Badiou, Being	 and	
Event (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 2013).  
